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Abstract 
Despite its potential hazards, the activity of questioning theoretical frameworks and proposing 
solutions is necessary if progress is even to be possible. Intellectual history has by no means 
ended, so we cannot expect to have all the answers, and from time to time the activity of 
critical questioning will be frustrating. But intellectual progress requires us to continue the 
process of asking fundamental questions. The alternative to thinking in this way is indeed 
unthinkable. 
 
Introduction 
It is easy for those of us who work in education to see the value of thinking, including explicit 
theorising about questions of fundamental importance. In previous thematic editions of this 
journal, we have argued that the practice of critical thinking is of fundamental importance if 
virtue, progress and more enlightened practices are to be possible. [1-3] Without populations 
– in the workplace and in society generally – able to expose underlying assumptions that 
frequently frame popular debate, we are at the mercy of the spin-doctors and opinion-
managers who have made the control of human behaviour their explicit goal. [4-7] In 
populations governed by the principle of 'moderate anti-intellectualism' [1] people are 
encouraged to think about 'how-to' questions – how to accomplish certain tasks, to apply 
established rules, guidelines and theoretical frameworks in particular situations and to 
achieve pre-determined goals.  But underlying, 'why' questions – about the justification for the 
goals, the intellectual basis for the rules and guidelines as opposed to possible alternatives – 
are dismissed as impractical. In a world in which we are constantly bombarded with bad 
arguments, inadequate rationalisations and rhetorical ploys to make us conform to 
unquestioned norms, [7] it makes very little sense to talk of such a population as containing 
autonomous people – meaning persons who think for themselves and are in full, rational 
control of their own actions.[6,7] 
However, there are also serious concerns about the potential damage theorising can do. If 
employed in the wrong ways, theorising can either serve to undermine the common-sense 
knowledge of practitioners and patients, deny truths that would otherwise be intuitively 
obvious or cause us to be sceptical in situations where in fact trust would be the more 
beneficial, more human reaction.[6,8-10] The view that theory should, in some sense be 
'grounded in' experience would command very broad support, as would the claim that a key 
Page 1 of 10 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
For peer review only
goal of theory is to produce conclusions that facilitate more effective practice. But these broad 
claims would be supported by defenders of radically different views about the proper basis of 
practice,[3] from authors with a 'positivist' approach to evidence and clinical reasoning [11-14] 
to defenders of phenomenological approaches to reasoning in practice. [15,16] Even the view 
that medicine should be more 'person-centred' can be conceptualised and justified in a variety 
of – potentially incompatible – ways [17], as some of the contributions to this edition strikingly 
demonstrate. 
In this thematic edition of the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, we present a range of 
papers that raise questions or problems about not only the intellectual basis for practice, but 
also about the dangers inherent in theorising about practice – the sense that the wrong sort of 
theorising can actually be harmful. Such questions are sometimes characterised as matters of 
'philosophical methodology' in that they express concerns about how we go about addressing 
important, underlying questions if we are to say something actually helpful to practitioners and 
patients. Contributors present different views about the sort of thinking we need when 
discussing questions of ethics, knowledge and reasoning in clinical practice – reflecting 
radically different views of what it means to have a basis for practice, and why one should 
need such a thing in the first place. 
Thinking as a way of challenging or conforming to 'the norm' 
The edition begins with a debate about the assumptions not only of medical ethics but of the 
very activity of theorising about morality, at least as such theorising has typically been 
conducted for much of our intellectual history. [18-20] Joel Backström and Hannes Nykänen 
[18] note that, from the development of the Hippocratic Oath to current debates about 
bioethics and values-based practice, [21,22] a “dominant conception that morality is a matter 
of values and valuation” is typically treated as self-evident. The authors claim that this 
conception encourages us to ignore a fundamental truth about the nature of moral 
experience. It effectively represses conscience, the fundamental importance of what they 
characterise as the “I-you” relationship. They argue that all moral theories – including Kantian 
and utilitarian theories and even approaches based on the concept of virtue – serve to codify 
and reinforce dominant ideas in society, encouraging us to ignore our moral experience and 
internalise collective values or dispositions. Moral relativism and moral particularism are seen 
as responses to this dominant conception that fail to escape its underlying assumptions. 
In his response, [19] Stephen Buetow tries to work out the implications of this critique of moral 
theorising for practical debates about healthcare, dev loping implications of Backström and 
Nykänen's argument and interrogating the meaning of some of their key claims.  He applauds 
their defence of conscience and notes their warnings about “non-reflectively identifying with 
the collective values of society” at a time when concern is growing that, “rather than relate to 
themselves and patients as persons, clinicians embrace anonymized, normative demands of 
group values.”  He welcomes the analysis because it helps to explain what he regards as the 
“rising depersonalization in health care, lack of resistance to this development and a need to 
revitalize person-centred health care.”  However, he rejects what he sees as a false 
dichotomy in their work between 'conscience' on the one hand and both 'value' and 'virtue' on 
the other. For Buetow, commitment to conscience is still compatible with “constructing person-
centred care as a virtue ethic nourishing authenticity and reciprocated caring”. We should not 
so much be jettisoning such concepts as 'virtue' and 'value' (he is not sure how we could) as 
noting the possible dangers in their (mis)use. 
In their counter-response,[20] the authors reiterate their fundamental points that “conscience 
is a concern for people, in the sense of an ‘I’ to a ‘you’, not for values, beliefs, norms, 
principles, etc” and that dominant, “value‐based ethics is a repression (ie self‐deceptive 
denial and evasion) of conscience”. Referring to examples and the history of moral 
philosophy, they note that: “The problems in different versions of value‐ethics are legion,” 
and “proponents of various positions – Kantians, consequentialists, virtue‐ethicists, etc. – 
have managed to shoot their opponents full of holes, so that no man remains standing.”  They 
regard their critique as a major challenge to theoretical arguments that have shaped our 
conception not only of medical ethics but of moral thinking more generally for centuries, so 
they expect Buetow – and perhaps many others – to struggle in getting to grips with its 
implications. 
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Certainly such a broad critique of moral theories will lead some to wonder what role, if any, 
moral theory can have in informing practice.  Backström and Nykänen seem to ascribe all 
ideas about value, virtue and principle to the role of 'repression', while Buetow wants to stress 
that these ideas can form part of more defensible conceptions of ethics – though he agrees 
with them that all such ideas, like their own favoured idea of 'conscience', can in fact be 
abused to form rationalisations for clearly immoral acts.  While value-theory can function 
simply to reinforce non-rational norms/consensus, for him this is not an essential 
characteristic of such theories. The history of philosophical debate in this area has not ended 
with all the major approaches effectively refuting each other.  Rather, it is on-going, and the 
major traditions, precisely through their radical differences, have all brought out important 
aspects of moral thinking – and part of the exercise of good conscience is in weighing the 
significance of these aspects in making decisions in particular cases. 
The section continues with a paper whose subject matter and methodology are strikingly 
different from the approaches of those papers already mentioned, and yet whose conclusions 
resonate with that debate.  Focussing specifically on medical decision-making, Michael 
Morreau and Aidan Lyon use a multi-agent computer simulation of groups of physicians to test 
the assumption that common standards lead to better decision-making. [23] The standards, in 
this case, are epistemic and concern deliberation in groups and the use of scores and grades 
in evaluation. The authors note that: “One might expect individual differences in members’ 
grading standards to reduce the capacity of the group to discover the facts on which well-
informed decisions depend.” However, their observations of the simulated groups suggest 
that: “on the contrary... this kind of diversity can in fact be conducive to epistemic 
performance. Sometimes, it is adopting common standards that may be expected to result in 
poor decisions.” This conclusion resonates with recent arguments in support of social and 
cognitive diversity, [24] and explanatory pluralism. [25] 
Utilsing Longino's arguments about the centrality of diversity and public critique within a 
community of scientists, [26] Emily Bingeman applies Longino’s criteria for assessing the 
objectivity of a knowledge-productive community to assess Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) 
against a casuistic framework for medical knowledge. [27] She argues that “EBM’s strict 
adherence to a hierarchical organization of knowledge can reasonably be expected to block it 
from fulfilling a high level of objectivity.”  In contrast, she claims that a casuistic framework 
“could be expected to better facilitate a more optimal epistemic community,” because it 
emphasizes critical evaluation in conjunction with the flexibility of a case-based approach.  
Medical concepts and reality 
Does involvement in the practice of medicine commit us to any particular set of philosophical 
assumptions about the world and our place within it? If so, are those assumptions open to 
criticism and what implications for practice might such criticisms have? Anna Louise 
Kirkengen and colleagues [28] argue that contemporary medicine's perception of reality is 
theoretically loaded in ways that may once have served the interests of progress in specific 
areas, but which now stand in its way. Current medical knowledge, they maintain, ignores 
central tenets of human existence, notably the physiological impact of subjective experience, 
relationships, history, and sociocultural contexts. While the “materialistic shift of enlightenment 
philosophy” was at one point crucial to progress in medicine and “yielded astonishing results”, 
contemporary medicine now faces problems that cannot be solved (or indeed properly 
characterised, let alone understood) by “more of the same”. They conclude that the 
biomedical framework now needs radical revision: “we must acknowledge that health, 
sickness and bodily functioning are interwoven with human meaning-production, 
fundamentally personal and biographical.” 
In contrast, Seth Joshua Thomas [29] sets out to defend evidence-based healthcare against 
the claim that it it is committed to a particular, 'reductionist' world view and to question the 
philosophical commitments of some of its critics. Focussing on the claim that an “emphasis on 
the hierarchy of evidence, grounded in the use of randomized controlled trials” embodies a 
philosophical commitment to a “modernist” conception of reality, Thomas disputes the 
apparent implication that the approaches to healthcare he identifies as “evidence-based” 
inevitably “fail to recognize the patient as the complex self she is, treating her instead as 
merely a quantifiable, medical-scientific object.” For Thomas, a purely scientific method is “in 
principle neutral with regard to questions of selfhood”, so there can simply be no question of a 
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philosophical tension between evidence-based and person-centred approaches, and no need 
for the sort of 'philosophical overhaul' called for by other contributors to this edition. 
The view that scientific reasoning can indeed embody significant philosophical commitment is 
taken seriously by Daniele Chiffi and Renzo Zanotti. [30] Presenting examples from clinical 
reasoning, these authors explore the epistemological and metaphysical commitments in 
perspectives on clinical possibility. They note that modal concepts are widely used in clinical 
reasoning, but philosophical debate on such notions is still at an initial stage. Opening up 
what they regard as an important new line of research in the philosophy of healthcare, they 
argue that almost all clinical possibilities are potentialities: “that is, possibilities that may be 
actualised by effective, appropriate and feasible interventions” and they introduce “some 
basic views on the nature of possibility, showing their validity and limitations when applied to 
the concept of clinical possibility.”  Their discussion is followed by a contribution from Matthew 
Mercuri and Brian Baigrie, [31] which examines the use of epidemiological risk information as 
evidence of causation in medical court cases.  They illustrate various standards of evidence – 
including statistical significance, relative risks (RRs) that are greater than 2, and biological 
plausibility – through the case of Goodman v. Viljoen, a medical malpractice suit. They find 
that multiple kinds of evidence were brought to bear in establishing individual causation, and 
find analogies as well as disanalogies between the legal context and the clinical context when 
using risk information to make causal attributions or predictions. 
In addition to philosophical commitments concerning the nature of possibility and causation, 
medical reasoning also raises questions of ontological commitment with regard to the nature 
of disease. [32] Such questions are particularly pressing in the area of psychiatry. As Sam 
Fellows notes: “Validity of psychiatric syndromes is typically associated with questions over 
their reality.” [33] Fellows argues that Kendell and Jablensky’s account of validity – which links 
the validity of a syndrome to its causation by a specific biological mechanism not present in 
other syndromes – is overly restrictive. He argues that: “Scientific phenomena are the product 
of a multiplicity of unstable overlapping causes but this does not mean our descriptions of 
scientific phenomena are automatically arbitrary.” Rather, he claims, science deals with 
multiple unstable causes by producing idealised models that can be “approximately true”. 
Returning to the crucial questions about contemporary medical ontology raised by Kirkengen 
et al [28], and building on her important discussion of 'metaphysical care' and the ontology of 
disease in the previous philosophy thematic edition of this journal, [32] Alexandra Parvan 
attempts to lay philosophical foundations for person-centred healthcare. [34] While Parvan 
would clearly agree with Kirkengen and colleagues that contemporary biomedicine needs to 
rethink its theoretical basis, her own analysis of current medical thinking is somewhat different 
from theirs, as is her own recipe for a genuinely humanistic, person-centred approach to care. 
Going back to ancient philosophical views of disease as ‘bounded entity’ or as ‘relation', 
Parvan proposes a way to think ontologically about disease “that places it in necessary 
connection with the patient as person”, drawing on Augustine’s views on disease, bodily 
integrity, and the human person as mind-body unit. 
Ramesh Prasad [35] asks what determines the 'ownership' of human body parts, looking in 
particular at cases of transplantation where the biological integrity of the whole person is 
disrupted. He makes the distinction between “internal” and “external property” and claims that 
“Poor outcomes in some types of kidney donors may be due not only to a failure in their 
proper selection by standard medical testing or post-donation care, but may also be a 
manifestation of differing effects on sense of self resulting from transfer of their internal 
property.” In contrast to dopamine levels that altruistic behaviour increases, commercial 
donation may produce cortisol or adrenergic-based responses because the brain interprets 
the donation as traumatic in the absence of a concurrent feeling of reward. Thus, there may 
be a cognitive basis to society’s antipathy to commercial kidney transplantation. If screening 
rules that treat a kidney as external property are inadvertently harming some living donors, a 
property transfer approach, informed by a careful cognitive assessment, could help to 
regulate harm associated with neurocognitive changes in the donors. 
The section concludes with David Misselbrook's insightful and engaging discussion of the 
ontology of health and the goals of medicine. [36] Utilising ideas taken from the very different 
philosophies of Aristotle and Hume, Misselbrook presents an analysis of contemporary 
debates about naturalist, biostatistical and normative accounts of health and disease and 
defends an Aristotelian conception of 'human flourishing' as a key goal for medical practice. 
Page 4 of 10Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
For peer review only
Like all good examples of applied philosophy, his paper makes underlying philosophical 
questions highly accessible and uses the problems of practice to raise questions that 
challenge distinctions operating in mainstream academic philosophical debate. 
Medical Epistemology: expertise, paternalism, diagnosis and bias 
Theoretical questions about the nature of knowledge seem inescapable for defenders of any 
approach to clinical reasoning and practice, be they exponents of EBM, or indeed of patient- 
or person-centred care. In the context of continued debates about the future of EBM, [37,38] 
Rudolfo Gaeta and Nelida Gentile [39] use epistemology and Kuhn's philosophy of science to 
present a conception of EBM as a 'meta-methodology”. Insofar as the development of EBM 
as a movement represented a genuinely new alternative in the field of medicine, showing a 
way in which the discipline would henceforth endure, the authors show that it could not have 
been what Kuhn meant by a 'paradigm', but this potentially reflects the problems with Kuhn's 
philosophy as much as it reflects any identity-crisis in EBM. 
Motivated in the first instance by the problem that gave rise to Parvan's analysis, [32,34] that 
of patient non-adherence to physicians' recommendations, Mary-Clair Yelovich [40] develops 
a thesis on the nature and limits of expertise that provides “a new epistemological framework 
that recognizes legitimate knowledge offered by the patient as well as the physician.” By 
treating the clinical encounter not only as “an encounter between persons” [41] but as a 
meeting of experts, Yelovich develops a “patient expertise framework within the paradigm of 
patient-centred medicine”. Assuming the goal of medical treatment to be alleviation of 
suffering, patient expertise becomes centralized as a means of determining the nature of 
patient suffering. Drawing on ideas clearly at work in the paper by Kirkengen et al, [28] 
Yelovich identifies two aspects of the patient’s tacit knowledge: the body aspect and the 
meaning aspect, both of which, she notes, are context-dependent and directly accessible only 
to the patient. She notes that both are “recognised as essential to the success of the 
interaction”, and clearly distinguished from the equally essential expertise of the clinician. She 
argues in detail the practical advantages of this approach for the problem she set out to 
address. 
In stark contrast, the contribution by Anthony Fry and Tania Gergel [42] looks at the need for 
paternalism in clinical practice, when the conditions for the sort of patient-centred approach 
Yelovich outlines do not obtain. In a paper presented to the workshop on Paternalism and 
Trust at Kings College London, reported in the previous philosophy thematic edition of JECP, 
[43] the authors discuss a case where paternalism se ms appropriate. Factitious Disorder 
(FD) is usually classified as a mental disorder involving deliberate and hidden feigning or 
inducement of illness, in order to achieve patient status. (In such a case, it is hard to know 
what to make of the concept of patient expertise.) Looking at case histories, the authors argue 
that there are no compelling reasons for rejecting the use of paternalistic interventions for FD, 
but that further investigation of FD and frameworks for psychiatric paternalism, in relation to 
FD and other mental disorders, are urgently needed. 
Noting that diagnosis is “arguably the cornerstone of medicine”, Ashley Kennedy attempts to 
to “extend the work that Worrall and Cartwright have done on the evaluation of medical 
treatments to the topic of medical diagnosis.” [44] Much has been written on the role of 
randomized controlled trials and mechanistic reasoning in the evaluation of therapeutic 
treatments, but the question of how diagnostic tests and procedures should be evaluated is 
surprisingly under-theorised. Kennedy begins by addressing a series of questions about 
accuracy, effectiveness and value, noting that diagnostic value extends beyond patient 
outcomes. 
Wendy Rogers and Yishai Mintztker [45] look at the problem of overdiagnosis, when 
diagnosis does not benefit the patient because the condition diagnosed is not a harmful 
disease in those patients. Looking at a range of examples, from cancer screening to attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, they classify two different types of overdiagnosis. 
Misclassification overdiagnosis arises because the diagnostic threshold for the disease (they 
give the illustration of chronic kidney disease) has been set at a level where many people 
without harmful disease are nonetheless diagnosed. Maldetection overdiagnosis arises 
because, at the time the diagnosis is made and despite the presence of a ‘gold standard’ 
diagnostic test, it is not possible to discriminate between harmful and non-harmful cases of 
the index disease – they give the example of thyroid cancer. Like the paper by Fry and 
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Gergel, this one proposes that the first stage for addressing the problem is to develop an 
adequate conceptual analysis. 
Donald Stanley and Daniel Campos [46] investigate logical strategies for narrowing the list of 
diagnostic hypotheses during the diagnostic process, including Bayesian confirmation theory, 
frequentist statistics and inference to the best explanation. They discuss these strategies in 
the context of six realistic clinical cases, showing how informal clinical reasoning can be 
understood as instances of these confirmation theories that are familiar to philosophers of 
science. Stanley and Campos ultimately argue for using the full range of inferential strategies 
available rather than limiting diagnostic reasoning to just one approach. 
Matthew Maddocks and colleagues [47] discuss problems in ‘placebo-controlled’ 
physiotherapy trials and how the use of inadequate placebos can lead to systematic bias, 
sometimes underestimating and sometimes overestimating the treatment effect. They adopt 
Grűnbaum’s classic definition of a placebo, which has: all of the incidental features of the 
treatment, none of the characteristic features, and nothing more. They use three published 
physiotherapy trials that may have suffered from bias due to an inadequate placebo control to 
illustrate how failure to satisfy Grűnbaum’s criteria might account for biased estimation of the 
treatment effect, and argue that because of the difficulty of constructing placebos in 
physiotherapy trials it is often necessary to use other trial designs. 
Phenomenological ap roaches 
As noted in our opening comments, for many authors the only adequate 'base' for theorising 
about practice is in lived experience: we do not understand health and illness, or the purpose 
and nature of healthcare, unless we ground that understanding in the everyday experience of 
those who have to live with the problems we aim to address. [15,16]  This section includes 
papers that attempt to illustrate the uses of phenomenology in the discussion of healthcare. 
Juan Borda [48] discusses the relationship between Bipolar Disorder (BD) and Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD). Despite intense debate for two decades, current diagnostic 
classifications approach this complex phenomenon using syndromatic definitions based on 
presence or absence of a restricted set of signs or symptoms which have demonstrated low 
specificity. Borda argues that the phenomenological method in psychiatry can complement 
other approaches, helping identify differences between two separated clinical syndromes. 
Borda sets out to explore one particular clinical difference between these two conditions: the 
experience of self-continuity and time perception. While BPD patients tend to experience only 
the present, BD patients are constantly worried about the contradictions in their past 
experiences, and the latent risk of losing control of themselves in future episodes of their 
disease. This contrast needs to be corroborated in future research comparing directly the two 
groups in terms of the continuity of the self and their temporal structures. 
Ines Hipolito [49] discusses the phenomenology of intersubjective impairment, in a paper that 
attempts to show that “the second-person perspective” can be used to point out particular 
features of social cognition and its related psychopathology. Characterising the second-
person perspective as “the congruence point between an objective process and the subjective 
experience,” Hipolito tries to explain schizophrenia as a self-related deficit, first in the light of 
the first- and the third-person perspective; and afterward, in the light of the currently less 
understood second-person perspective. 
Drawing on psychiatric literature and philosophical work on self-knowledge, Jordi Fernandez 
and Suzanne Blis [50] discuss how schizophrenia affects a subject’s sense of self. They 
consider experience of alienation of mental states and actions and propose that the 
experience of thoughts, feelings, impulses and actions as not being one’s own is the 
experience of not being able to find reasons in support of occupying those states. To make 
sense of these phenomena they propose two components to our normal sense of self, 
understanding schizophrenia with reference to the dissociation of these components. 
Debates 
This year's debates section contains two responses to previously published articles in this 
journal.  Responding to Alexandra Parvan's paper in the previous philosophy thematic [32] on 
patients' “substantialisation of disease” and metaphysical care, Thor Erik Eriksen and Anna 
Luise Kirkengen [51] begin by providing their own reflection on the epistemological and 
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ontological questions raised by the phenomenon of medically unexplained symptoms or 
syndromes(MUS).  They argue that “such health challenges can serve as the basis for an 
exploration of how the suffering person as well as the medical caretaker come to grips with 
disease, incapacitation or suffering.” While they broadly welcome and support Parvan's efforts 
“to provide a renewed language as regards human suffering”, they fear she has given too 
much ground to biomedical ontology and epistemology: “when, for example, she perpetuates 
the prevailing biomedical concepts of the doctors’ role as knowers and the patients’ role as 
adaptors.” In support of this point they cite her language of “non-adherence” - matched with 
the idea of clinicians being the suppliers of “metaphysical care”. Their own account of the 
phenomenon Parvan terms “substantialisation” (for which they prefer the term “thingification”) 
describes “a process wherein patients reify their suffering in order to meet their doctors on 
equal terms, which carries a potential for alienation.” Whether we are patients or practitioners, 
we need a new philosophical framework if we are to avoid the problems Parvan's paper 
highlighted. 
Reading both this commentary and Parvan's contribution to this thematic, [34] we feel these 
authors' differences are less significant than their similarities, and we look forward to further 
productive exchanges on these vital underlying questions: about how we conceptualise 
health, illness, suffering and ultimately ourselves.  As noted in our opening comments, the 
wrong theoretical assumptions can indeed stand in the way of progress, and these authors 
are to be praised for questioning underlying conceptions that may strike many as “sheer 
common sense”, given our current, dominant conceptions of the world and our place within it. 
The edition concludes with a commentary by Michael Loughlin, Peter Wyer & Sandy 
Tanenbaum, [52] in reply to an article by Milos Jenicek [53] in last year's EBM-thematic 
edition of this journal. Responding to the 'crisis' for EBM identified by prominent contributors 
to the debate, [37,38] Jenicek proposed a “new medical cognitive science” that would 
“supplement” EBM with certain “gnostic or epistemological processes” to address what he 
sees as a deficit in EBM's approach to clinical reasoning.[53] While Loughlin and colleagues 
find Jenicek's paper fundamentally confused, they nonetheless regard it as an extremely 
helpful contribution. They explain this apparently paradoxical assessment by noting there are 
fundamental epistemological questions regarding EBM that remain unaddressed. While some 
commentators seem happy to brush over vital questions about EBM's intellectual heritage, 
taking little note of the distinction between empiricist and rationalist approaches to medical 
epistemology, [29] Loughlin et al regard an accurate account of this heritage as vital to 
understanding the current EBM debate and to the possibility of making serious intellectual 
progress in this area. They argue that Jenicek effectively attempts to 'supplement' an 
empiricist framework with a rationalist conception of reasoning, and this amounts to a 
philosophically untenable project. However, the attempt to reconcile these opposed epistemic 
traditions, to find something worthwhile in each of them, (much like the effort to reconcile 
opposing ethical traditions discussed in our opening sections) may well turn out to be the way 
forward for medical epistemology: 
“the failure of [Jenicek's] identified ‘approaches’ to ‘interconnect’ requires us to give more 
explicit attention to the underlying epistemological assumptions that frame the EBM debate. 
While we think he fails to solve the problem he identifies, that failure can, in itself, teach us 
something about its fundamental nature. There are times when proposing a confused solution 
to a problem is a better way to move a debate forward than simply insisting that there is 
nothing to feel confused about.” 
This point seems pertinent with regard to our opening comments about the activity of 
theorising. Despite its potential hazards, the activity of questioning theoretical frameworks and 
and proposing solutions is necessary if progress is even to be possible. Intellectual history 
has by no means ended [54,55] so we cannot expect to have all the answers, and from time 
to time the activity of critical questioning will be frustrating.  But intellectual progress requires 
us to continue the process of asking fundamental questions. The alternative to thinking in this 
way is indeed unthinkable. 
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